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1 Introduction
The late 2000s saw a dramatic deterioration of local government budgets across
Europe, with the mounting local hidden debt issue raising doubts about the
success of announced fiscal austerity and international rescue programs (Euro-
pean Central Bank, 2011; Lojsch, Rodriguez-Vives and Slavik, 2011). Amongst
Southern European countries, the sudden worsening of Portugal budget figures
towards the end of 2011 was partly due to the emergence of extensive local
government financial distress, with the small island of Madeira alone disclosing
a spectacular debt of over €6 billion.1 In Spain, regional governments account
for over a third of public spending as well as of national public deficit, and had
their debts doubled during the financial crisis, with large autonomous commu-
nities like Catalonia systematically overshooting their deficit targets and forcing
central government to impose quarterly budget reporting (Ministry of Finance
and Public Administration, 2011).2
In Italy, economic growth slowdown and nationwide fiscal consolidation poli-
cies posed a threat on the sustainability of regional governments’ finances. In
spite of the profound reforms of the regional revenue raising structure that took
place between the late 1990s and early 2000s, the terms of the financial re-
lationship between the state and the regions remained opaque, deepening the
soft budget constraint problem and generating unprecedented regional deficit
figures in the subsequent years. In fact, systematic under-funding of regional
authorities, creation of budget deficits, and unconditional ex post financial in-
tervention (bailing out) on the part of the state were recurrent and almost
structural features of the system of state-region relationships in Italy until the
mid 2000s. However, the release, after the 2005 nationwide regional elections,
of sensational data on the debt accumulated over the latest terms of oﬃce in a
number of regions, finally led the state government to mandate increases in re-
gional own tax rates in order to have the burden of debt recovery fall onto those
regions’ taxpayers. In particular, the regional business income tax rate - an ori-
gin based net income-type value added tax on all business activities - increased
by state command by one percentage point in 2007, with further mandated rate
increases following into regions that were not complying with the agreed upon
fiscal consolidation plans.
The objective of this paper is to investigate the eﬀects of centrally mandated
tax increases on local economic performance. To what extent decentralized tax
policy influences business location, investment, employment and output growth
has long been debated in the theoretical and empirical literature. The early em-
pirical evidence based on longitudinal observations at fairly large spatial units
- US states - typically failed to unveil a large impact of taxes on economic per-
formance, fueling skepticism about the ability of tax breaks and investment tax
credits alone to stimulate state economic development (Bartik, 1985). However,
it is by now well known that empirical research into the impact of tax policy on
economic activity is plagued by endogeneity problems making it prohibitive to
1“Portugal dealt blow over budget goal,” Financial Times, October 4, 2011.
2 “Hidden debt raises Spain bond fears,” Financial Times, May 16, 2011.
estimate the eﬀect of taxes on the economy correctly. Given that fiscal policy
is determined by current or prospective economic conditions, macro approaches
relying on administrative data require exogenous sources of policy variation in
order to identify the causal eﬀect of public policy on the economy (Barro and
Redlick, 2011).
The policy endogeneity problem has been recently tackled by recurring to
spatial discontinuities at borders using smaller spatial aggregates such as the
US counties (Holmes, 1998; Chirinko and Wilson, 2008). Moreover, thanks to
the increasing availability of large micro datasets on firm location and char-
acteristics, empirical works based on geo-coded establishment information are
flourishing.3 Still, as argued in Duranton, Gobillon and Overman (2011), the
likely presence of unobserved location-specific eﬀects, establishment-specific ef-
fects, and omitted variables driving both time-varying site characteristics and
local tax rates calls for an econometric approach based on spatial diﬀerencing
(to deal with unobserved location-specific eﬀects), time diﬀerencing (to deal
with establishment-specific eﬀects), and a proper set of instrumental variables
to tackle the local tax policy endogeneity issue.
An alternative approach is the one advocated by Romer and Romer (2010)
and applied by Cloyne (2011). The idea is to distinguish between endogenous
and exogenous policy changes based on a categorization of observed discre-
tionary policy changes that relies on the history and motivation of those tax
changes - the so-called narrative record. Among the various motivations lead-
ing to a classification of a policy change as exogenous, Romer and Romer (2010:
p. 770) maintain that “one particular motivation that is common and that falls
into the exogenous category are tax increases to deal with an inherited budget
deficit.” Cloyne (2011: p. 9) classifies as exogenous the actions “enforced by ex-
ternal bodies.” This suggests that a top-down mandate on financially distressed
local authorities’ own tax rates seems as close as one can get to an exogenous tax
change, and is the approach that I pursue here to tackle the policy endogeneity
issue in a multi-tiered, hierarchical government structure.
I first model factor input use within a multi-jurisdiction neoclassical model,
where, as in Cooley, Hansen and Prescott (1995), the aggregate production
function in each of a number of localities exhibits constant returns to scale
in plant locations, physical capital, and labor, and where physical capital re-
quires energy in fixed proportions depending on the size of energy-saving capi-
tal that is installed along with physical capital (Diaz, Puch and Guillo, 2004).
Energy-saving capital can either be interpreted as tangible information tech-
nology (IT) equipment directly reducing the energy required to produce the fi-
nal good (such as computer-aided technologies and industrial process electronic
control devices), or, more generally, as intangible assets including knowledge,
organizational structure, and process design skills (Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang,
2002). As in conventional energy use models, physical capital is assumed to be
3Recent examples are Devereux, Griﬃth and Simpson (2007), Rathelot and Sillard (2008)
and Duranton, Gobillon and Overman (2011). Brulhart, Jametti and Schmidheiny (2012)
study the eﬀect of corporate taxes on firm births using panel data on new firm counts per
municipality and economic sector in Switzerland.
a quasi-fixed factor moving slowly over time in response to input price changes,
while energy-saving capital smoothly responds to shocks (Bresnahan, Brynjolf-
sson and Hitt, 2002).
By incorporating a multi-level tax structure, where the upper level (state)
authority collects corporate income tax revenues and lower-level authorities (re-
gions and localities) levy a business income tax and an excise tax on business
energy use respectively, the model predicts that the regional business income tax
negatively aﬀects both forms of capital as well as the use of energy in the long
run. However, energy and energy-saving capital turn out to be Allen substitutes
in the short run. As for the price of energy, the local energy tax lowers the long
run equilibrium levels of physical capital and energy - a conventional result in
both putty-putty and putty-clay energy use models (Atkeson and Kehoe, 1999)
- while its impact on energy-saving capital is ambiguous. In the short run,
an higher energy price raises energy-saving capital’s productivity and reduces
aggregate energy use.
In order to identify the causal eﬀect of factor input taxes on their use em-
pirically, I exploit the regional business income tax rate increases that were
mandated by the state in the Italian regions with excessive budget deficits, as
well as the fact that provincial authorities directly tax energy by setting an
excise tax on all business electricity uses, with the sole exemption of massive
energy-intensive establishments. The estimation results based on panel data for
the Italian provinces and regions over a decade (2000-2010) reveal that while
mandated business income tax hikes had no eﬀect on regional gross domestic
product, they had a significant detrimental impact on employment in the service
sector, and particularly on the use of human resources in science and technology
(S&T) occupations, the latter being interpretable as a proxy for energy-saving
capital. Moreover, it turns out that regional business income tax increases
stimulate province-level business energy use, lending support to the hypothesis
of short run substitution between energy and energy-saving capital. On the
other hand, there is no evidence of significant fiscal spillovers across regional or
provincial boundaries, suggesting that tax policy changes did not bring about
any major shift of production facilities or variable factor input use to low-tax
localities. Finally, provincial excise taxes on energy are found to discourage
business consumption of energy, particularly in the service sector where most
small and medium-sized firms are found.
Section 2 models factor input taxation by decentralized authorities in an
hierarchical structure of government. The model does not tackle the political
economy issue of how fiscal mandates are decided upon, nor does it discuss the
relative merits of alternative, non-hierarchical state-local institutional arrange-
ments. I will come back to these issues in the concluding section 5. As for the
remaining part of the paper, section 3 turns to illustrating the evolution of the
regional deficit-bailout issue in Italy through the 2000s, and section 4 presents
the results of the empirical analysis.
2 Hierarchical taxation and factor input use
2.1 Technology
Business activity is carried out in a finite number L of localities. Localities are
partitioned into a set of R regions, with r and l indexing the region and the
locality respectively, and Lr ≥ 1 the number of localities in region r. Within
each locality, production of a final good x takes place at a fixed number of ex
ante identical plant locations ml = ml. Locations in this economy constitute a
fixed factor of production, and owners of locations earn positive rents (Cooley,
Hansen and Prescott, 1995). In particular, a plant consists of a location, capital
installed in it, and a fixed requirement of labor and energy to operate it. Let klr
index the stock of physical capital that is directly employed for productive uses
at a plant in locality l in region r.4 Similarly to Atkeson and Kehoe (1999),
physical capital is assumed to require energy in fixed proportions to deliver
capital services. However, instead of posing the existence of a continuum of
capital goods that embody an exogenously given energy intensity (an intrinsic
energy type), the energy eﬃciency score of a production process is determined
here by the size of energy-saving capital that is installed along with productive
physical capital (Diaz, Puch and Guillo, 2004). Let hlr index energy-saving
capital having the sole role of improving the energy eﬃciency of a plant, such as
computer-aided technologies and industrial process electronic control devices.5
At time t, the energy requirement (εlrt) of the physical capital installed in a
plant depends on its energy eﬃciency according to:
εlrt ≥
γ
hlrt
klrt (1)
where γhlrt indexes the energy requirement per unit of productive capital, and is
an inverse function of installed energy-saving capital, while γ > 0 is a technology
parameter. Any energy used in excess of γhlrt klrt is wasted.
The aggregate production function in locality l is:
Xlrt =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
ml
∙
αl
³
Klrt
ml
´θ
η
¸
0
if
εlrt ≥ γhlrt klrt and ηlrt ≥ η
otherwise
(2)
where θ < 1, and η is the fixed labor requirement, meaning that any labor
employed at a plant in excess of η has zero marginal product. Total factor
productivity αl diﬀers across localities because of time-invariant locality traits
reflecting, say, the quality of institutions or the level of social capital. Aggregate
production in locality l exhibits constant returns to scale in physical capital,
labor and locations.
4Lower case denotes plant-level variables; upper case denotes locality-level variables.
5While energy-saving capital can be interpreted as tangible IT equipment directly reduc-
ing the energy requirement, it might lend itself to a broad human capital interpretation as
discussed in section 4 below.
2.2 Tax structure and cross−steady-state input mix re-
sponse
In the multi-tiered structure of government of this economy, the state, the re-
gions and the localities set the following business-related taxes. First, realized
profits paid as dividends to the location owners are taxed at the nationwide,
proportional corporate income tax rate πt. A precise definition of the corporate
income tax base is given below. Regional governments set a net income-type
value added tax on business income, i.e., a tax on the returns to the two forms
of capital net of depreciation, wage payments, and realized profits, at an ad
valorem rate τrt. Finally, localities set an excise tax on energy at the rate μlrt.
Energy is elastically supplied to each locality at price v.
Debt interest expenses and labor costs are entirely deductible from the cor-
porate income tax base, but neither is from the regional business income tax
base. Depreciation allowances can be deducted from the tax base at the homo-
geneous rate δ0 for both taxes. Profits in locality l’s establishments (plrt) can
consequently be expressed as:
plrt =
∙
xlrt − (v + μlrt)
γklrt
hlrt
− clrt
¸
(1− πt − τrt) (3)
−wη(1− πt)− (klrt + hlrt) [(ι+ δ)− πt (ι+ δ0)− τ rtδ0]
where ι is the real interest rate and w is the wage rate.6 clrt is an idiosyncratic
cost shock that is assumed to be deductible from corporate and value added
taxes. It is independently and identically distributed across time and across
locations, according to a uniform distribution on the [c, c+∆c] interval, with
c,∆c > 0. clrt can be interpreted as capturing the cost of intermediate goods,
materials, and services needed to produce x at a given plant. Productive and
energy-saving capital are assumed to be supplied elastically to each locality, and
to depreciate at the same rate δ > δ0.7
Consider first a non-stochastic environment where clrt = c , a constant, and
the two forms of capital smoothly adjust in response to tax policy changes, with
energy use moving according to equation (1). Profit maximization at locality
l’s plants leads to the following first order conditions for k and h:
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
θαlkθ−1lrt η − vlrt
γ
hlrt
=
ι(1− πt) + δ
1− πt − τrt
h
1− δ0 πt+τrtι(1−πt)+δ
i
vlrt
γklrt
h2lrt
=
ι(1− πt) + δ
1− πt − τ rt
h
1− δ0 πt+τrtι(1−πt)+δ
i (4)
6 I abstract here from modelling the household sector, and assume that labor is elastically
supplied at the rate w in all localities. In order to focus on the eﬀect of tax policy changes,
all pre-tax input prices are taken to be time-invariant.
7The supply of capital goods might be upward sloping in the short run in the presence of
external costs of adjusting the capital stock (Goolsbee, 1998). However, the hypothesis that I
make here of a perfectly elastic supply curve for the two forms of capital is both conventional
and plausible in the context of small localities.
where vlrt = v+μlrt is the after-tax energy price, and the right hand side of (4)
is the conventional user cost of capital.8
According to the first order condition for productive capital, the net return
to an additional unit of physical capital in production is made of its marginal
product minus the energy cost that such unit entails given the energy-saving
capital that is installed, i.e., the energy requirement per unit of capital
³
γ
hlrt
´
times the energy price inclusive of the excise tax (vlrt). Such return is equalized
to the user cost of capital consisting of the compensation for lenders (ι), the
true economic depreciation rate (δ), the depreciation provision for tax purposes
(δ0), and state and regional tax rates (πt, τ rt). The first order condition for
energy-saving capital equates the marginal energy saving in energy price terms
- i.e., the energy consumption that is foregone thanks to an additional unit of
h, and that is increasing in the stock of physical capital installed in the plant -
to the rental cost of capital.
Consider the cross−steady-state changes in factor input use in response to
tax policy changes. Following an exogenous (mandated) increase in region r’s
business income tax rate τ rt, the user cost of capital increases. Given that both
forms of capital exhibit decreasing returns, productive and energy-saving capital
are driven away from region r. The Appendix proves the following:
Proposition 1 If plant energy use is set to εlrt = γhlrt klrt, then: (i)
dklrt
dτrt
< 0;
(ii) dhlrtdτrt < 0; (iii)
dεlrt
dτrt
< 0.
The new equilibrium input mix has lower physical capital, energy-saving
capital and overall energy use in region r’s localities as a result of the business
income tax increase. When all factors of production adjust, energy and capital
are complements, mimicking the conventional long-run result of neoclassical
energy use models (Pindyck and Rotemberg, 1983).
As far as energy tax policy is concerned, the Appendix proves the following:
Proposition 2 If plant energy use is set to εlrt = γhlrt klrt, then: (i)
dklrt
dμlrt
< 0;
(ii) dhlrtdμlrt > 0 if
klrt
hlrt
> θ1−θ ; (iii)
dεlrt
dμlrt
< 0.
As the price of energy increases, use of physical capital unambiguously de-
creases. On the other hand, energy-saving capital might either increase or de-
crease as a result of the energy tax shock. First, μ raises the marginal product
of energy-saving equipment, pushing towards a more intense use of h. Second, h
tends to diminish because less physical capital is employed. The final eﬀect on
the use of h turns out to depend on the energy intensity of production. At high
energy intensity (high klrthlrt ), the former eﬀect dominates, and the energy price
increase stimulates the use of energy-saving capital. The reverse occurs at low
energy intensity. Finally, as proven in the Appendix, energy use unambiguously
falls in the long run as a result of the energy tax hike.
8By assuming constant prices for productive capital and energy-saving equipment, I can
abstract from consideration of capital gains/losses on undepreciated stocks. Moreover, rental
rates for physical capital and IT energy-saving equipment are assumed equal (Krusell et al.,
2000).
2.3 Quasi-fixed factors and short run adjustment
Consider now the short run response of factor input use to fiscal perturbations.
In conventional energy use models, physical capital is taken to be a quasi-fixed
factor moving slowly in response to input price changes, while energy is treated
as a flexible input. In Pindyck and Rotemberg (1983) putty-putty model, the
presence of capital adjustment costs coupled with the high short run complemen-
tarity between energy and capital leads to little short run response of the former
to energy price shocks. In the long run, capital adjusts and so does energy, re-
producing a similar capital-energy ratio and generating a large cross-sectional
negative correlation between energy prices and capital. A considerable degree
of short run complementarity between energy and capital is found in putty-clay
models too (Atkeson and Kehoe, 1999), where a large variety of types of capital
goods are combined with energy in diﬀerent fixed proportions. The fact that
capital goods are designed with a fixed energy intensity and that investment in
each type of capital must be nonnegative delivers a low elasticity of energy use
to energy price in the short run. In the long run, permanent increases in energy
prices alter the mix of capital goods towards less energy-intensive types, with
energy use displaying a large own price elasticity.
As for energy-saving capital, the arguments spelled out and the evidence
reported in Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002), Brynjolfsson and Hitt
(2000), Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang (2002) suggest that it ought to be treated
as flexible. Indeed, since IT capital tends to be disproportionately associated
with intangible assets relative to ordinary physical capital, firms might sustain
adjustment costs in terms of software development, business process innovation,
and workplace organizational transformation before computer capital becomes
fully eﬀective. However, it is well documented by case examples and large-
sample empirical evidence that ITs are the easiest to vary of the assets in the
cluster of complementary innovations (Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2002),
and this hypothesis seems plausible in the context of narrowly focused energy-
saving technologies.
I allow establishments to be hit by idiosyncratic cost shocks clrt having the
stochastic properties defined above. Within this environment, entrepreneurs’
decision on production across the available plant locations takes place in two
stages: at the beginning of period t, they have to decide on physical capi-
tal installation in a locality. This occurs after observing the tax rate vector
z0lrt = [πt τ rt μlrt], but before observing the idiosyncratic shocks hitting plants.
All other variables, including the size of energy-saving capital employed and the
binary choice of whether a plant will actually be operated, are set in the second
stage, after observing the realization of clrt. The second stage decision deter-
mines the capacity utilization rate across locality l’s plants, with unprofitable
plants remaining idle.
Consider the second stage plant operation decision first: upon observing the
idiosyncratic shock clrt, and once k has already been installed, plant l is operated
if the value of output exceeds variable input costs, i.e., if net operating income
(ylrt) is positive:
ylrt ≡ (1− πt − τrt)
µ
αlkθlrtη − vlrt
γklrt
hlrt
− clrt − ηλrt − hlrturt
¶
≥ 0 (5)
where λrt ≡ w
³
1−πt
1−πt−τrt
´
is the tax-adjusted cost of labor, urt is the user cost
of capital in region r, and energy saving capital is set according to:
vlrt
γklrt
h2lrt
= urt ≡
ι(1− πt) + δ
1− πt − τrt
∙
1− δ0
πt + τ rt
ι(1− πt) + δ
¸
(6)
Let c∗lrt be the cutoﬀ cost shock at which plant l just breaks even:
c∗lrt = αlk
θ
lrtη − vlrt
γklrt
hlrt
− ηλrt − hlrturt (7)
meaning that whenever a plant has an higher cost shock than c∗lrt, it will remain
idle:
xlrt =
⎧
⎨
⎩
αlkθlrtη
0
if
clrt ≤ c∗lrt
clrt > c∗lrt
(8)
Given that clrt is uniformly distributed between c and c +∆c, the fraction
of plants that are operated in locality l is:
Pr(clrt < c∗lrt) =
c∗lrtR
c
1
∆c
dclrt =
c∗lrt − c
∆c
(9)
Turn now to the first stage decision about installation of physical capital.
Expected profits at locality l’s establishments are:
E [plrt| zlrt] (10)
= E [ylrt| zlrt]− klrt [(ι+ δ)− πt (ι+ δ0)− τrtδ0]
=
c∗lrtR
c
1
∆c
[ylrt| zlrt] dclrt − klrt [(ι+ δ)− πt (ι+ δ0)− τrtδ0]
Using the fact that c∗lrt = ∆c Pr(clrt < c
∗
lrt) + c from equation (9), the first
order condition for physical capital installation is:
∙
θαlkθ−1lrt η − vlrt
γ
hlrt
¸µ
c∗lrt − c
∆c
¶
= urt (11)
Equation (11) has a straightforward interpretation: the marginal return of
physical capital weighted by the probability that the plant will be operated
equals the user cost of capital. With physical capital determined according to
(11), expected use of energy in locality l is:
E [Elrt| zlrt] =
c∗lrtR
c
1
∆c
γklrt
hlrt
mldclrt (12)
=
γklrt
hlrt
ml Pr(clrt < c∗lrt)
Let us now see how expected energy use in locality l as defined in (12)
changes in response to tax policy changes, given the level of physical capital
determined in the first stage. The Appendix proves the following:
Proposition 3 If physical capital is installed in plants according to equation
(11), and plants are operated according to equation (8), then: (i) dE[Elrt|zlrt]dμlrt <
0; (ii) dE[Elrt|zlrt]dτrt > 0 if vlrt is lower than a cutoﬀ energy price v
∗
lrt.
An energy tax increase unambiguously lowers the use of energy in the short
run. First, an higher price of energy stimulates the use of energy-saving equip-
ment by raising its productivity (equation (6)), thereby curbing energy use.
Second, equations (7) and (9) show that the fraction of plants that are oper-
ated falls. On the other hand, a shock to τrt hikes the user cost of capital
and depresses the level of energy-saving capital (equation (6)), boosting energy
use; however, the plant operation rate diminishes, lowering expected energy use.
The former eﬀect dominates if energy prices are low, or net operating income is
high. It follows that, conditional on output, i.e., for given plant utilization rate
in a locality, energy-saving capital and energy are substitutes. In particular, the
short run cross-price Allen elasticity of energy with respect to the user cost of
capital (Atkeson and Kehoe, 1999) is:
dE[Elrt|zlrt]
durt
E[Elrt|zlrt]
urt
¯¯¯¯
¯
dK=0
dX=0
=
1
2
ψlrt (13)
where ψlrt ≡ hlrturtvlrtεlrt denotes the plant-level cost of energy-saving equipment
relative to the cost of energy. If, as in Diaz, Puch and Guillo (2004), we set
energy expenditures at 4.6% of GDP and energy-saving capital costs at 4.3% of
GDP, we obtain a short run Allen elasticity of energy use with respect to the
user cost of capital of 0.467, an almost identical figure as the one estimated by
Pindyck and Rotemberg (1983: p. 1074, Table 2, panel A).
3 Debts, bailouts and other failures in the Ital-
ian health service
Spending on health care constitutes the largest outlay in the Italian regions’
budgets. Total regional health expenditures surpassed €100 billion in 2006, or
around 7% of national GDP and over 80% of total regional spending, with an
annual real growth rate systematically exceeding that of GDP in the past two
decades. This brought Italy’s share of GDP spent on health from significantly
below the OECD average in the early 1990s to close to EU countries’ average
around the mid 2000s (Tediosi, Gabriele and Longo, 2009).
Since the introduction of the National Health Service (NHS) in 1978, the
major indicators of population health status soared: life expectancy at birth
rose by over six years in less than three decades (reaching 84 and 77 for females
and males respectively by the mid 2000s), the mortality rate almost halved, and
most indicators of overall health status improved significantly (Lo Scalzo et al.,
2009). In the World Health Organization (WHO) World Health Report (2000),
the Italian NHS ranked 2nd among 191 countries with respect to health status,
fairness in financial contribution, and responsiveness to people’s expectations
and needs. However, self-reported health conditions, satisfaction with the health
care system and popular perception of its quality and eﬃciency consistently
turned out to be among the lowest in Europe in a number of surveys (Blendon,
Kim and Benson, 2001; Maio and Manzoli, 2002).
While the Italian regions have been in charge of organizing, managing and
delivering health care services for over thirty years, the issue of the financing of
regional health expenditures is still amply debated. In the presence of public
provision of universal and mostly free of charge services at the point of consump-
tion through the NHS regional network, significant cross-regional patient flows,
and a marked north-south economic development and health status divide, it is
hardly surprising that the most contentious aspects of the federal health financ-
ing system concern the degree of accountability of regional governments to their
electorates and, more importantly, the role of the state in funding health and
redistributing resources among regions.9 During the late 1990s and early 2000s,
the own revenue structure of the regions was deeply reformed with the aim of
raising the health care budget share to be funded by own revenues (including an
own business income tax and a surcharge on the national personal income tax)
and fostering regional government accountability to their electorates. Moreover,
the state and the regions agreed in principle on a system of rewards and sanc-
tions to control excessive increases in expenditures and prevent the creation of
budget deficits. In spite of those eﬀorts, the terms of the financial relationships
between state and regional governments remained opaque enough as to allow the
soft budget constraint problem to explode in the subsequent years, and generate
unprecedented levels of regional deficits.
In fact, systematic ex ante under-funding of regional authorities, subsequent
generation of conspicuous budget deficits, and ex post financial intervention
(bailing out) on the part of the state have been recurrent and almost structural
features of the system of state-region relationships.10 However, the deterioration
of the regional budgets during the first half of the 2000s was further exacerbated
by the imposition of strict state limits on the tax rates that regions could set
on their own sources of revenue, and culminated in the release, after the 2005
regional elections, of sensational data on the debt levels accumulated over the
latest terms of oﬃce in a number of regions. The mounting popular outrage
fueled by news of malpractice, fraud and corruption episodes finally led the
newly elected national government in 2006 to mandate increases in regional
own tax rates in order to have the burden of fiscal consolidation fall only onto
9See Ferrario and Zanardi (2011) for a recent analysis of the degree of interregional redis-
tribution and equity attained by Italy’s NHS.
10A detailed picture of the deficit generation process by the regions is provided by Tediosi,
Gabriele and Longo (2009). Bordignon and Turati (2009) explain it as the outcome of a
state-regions strategic game based on expectations and credibility.
those regions’ taxpayers.11
In particular, the regional business income tax rate - an income-type value
added tax discussed in more detail below - increased by state command by
one percentage point (from the baseline rate of 4.25% to 5.25% of net value
added) in six financially distressed regions. In spite of a nationwide reduction
of the regional business income baseline rate to 3.90% as part of a fiscal stimulus
package launched in 2008, mandated rate increases followed in the subsequent
years for further regions exhibiting growing deficits.12 Moreover, the worsening
budgetary prospects in four regions induced the state to mandate additional
increases in the regional business income tax rate of 0.15% in 2009 and 2010.
Overall, as reported in table 1, almost half of the 20 Italian regions were aﬀected
by various state-mandated tax increases. The tax hikes led to an average fiscal
burden diﬀerential for businesses located in health deficit-running areas of over
1
4 relative to balanced budget regions.
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Data
I analyze the impact of state-mandated tax increases on a vector of indicators
of local economic performance. As mentioned above, the major subcentral tax
formally falling onto business is the regional business income tax (IRAP, Im-
posta Regionale sulle Attività Produttive). It is an origin based net income-type
value added tax set on all firms, including self-employed activities (Bordignon,
Giannini and Panteghini, 2001; Bird, 2003; Keen, 2003). The tax base is calcu-
lated annually by a direct subtraction method as the diﬀerence between gross
receipts (sales revenues) and the cost of intermediate goods and services.13 Nei-
ther labor costs nor debt interest payments are deductible, while conventional
tax depreciation provisions apply to outlays for capital goods. The tax is neu-
tral with respect to choice of organizational form, and to equity versus debt
financing.14 As for the tax rate, strict limitations on regional rates have existed
since the introduction of the tax in 1998: until 2007, a baseline rate of 4.25%
was set nationwide, and regions were allowed to vary it by one percentage point.
The central rate was then uniformly reduced to 3.90% in 2008, leaving regions
the possibility of increasing or decreasing it by 0.92 percentage points. How-
ever, regions made little use of their tax autonomy through the decade, in most
instances renouncing altogether to purposeful tax rate policy changes.
11Total regional debt amounted to over €16 billion in 2005, about half of it being attributable
to two regions (Lazio in central Italy and Campania in southern Italy).
12One region (Liguria) was allowed to come back to the baseline rate in 2008 thanks to
disciplined spending behavior and credible attempts to cut deficit.
13 Specific rules apply to financial intermediaries and insurance companies.
14Moreover, the tax does not discriminate between diﬀerent sources of equity capital (re-
tained earnings versus new subscriptions), and all profits are included in the tax base, irre-
spective of whether they are retained or distributed. No tax credit is given to shareholders
for the tax paid by the company (Bordignon, Giannini and Panteghini, 2001).
In addition, an excise consumption tax is applied by the lower-level of gov-
ernment - the provinces - on business uses of electricity. The provincial level
of government is made of 103 jurisdictions, whose average size roughly cor-
responds to that of the US counties and UK counties.15 The provincial tax
falls onto all enterprises employing electricity, with the sole exception of mas-
sive energy-intensive establishments exceeding kWh 200,000 consumption per
month (around fifty times the typical monthly electricity requirement of a small
firm). Provincial authorities can set a rate between a statewide lower limit of
€9.30 and an upper limit of €11.40 per 1,000 kWh. The limits have remained
unchanged in nominal terms through the past decade. Electricity tax revenues
make above 13 of provincial own revenues, the rest of provincial expenditures
- mostly in the areas of environmental protection and road maintenance - be-
ing funded by motor vehicle registration taxes and state grants (Di Porto and
Revelli, 2012; Revelli, 2010).
I use a number of indicators of economic performance. The first is energy
consumption at the provincial level, that is available by sector of economic activ-
ity on an yearly basis for the entire decade 2000− 2010.16 Energy consumption
data come from the nationwide holder of the electricity grid (TERNA, Rete
Elettrica Nazionale). Since I do not have micro-level data on energy use by
plants, I investigate the eﬀect of the energy tax both on total business energy
consumption in a province, and on business use in the service sector, where
average firm size is small and energy consumption is moderate. This includes
professional, craft, wholesale, retail and catering businesses. I also test the ef-
fect of the tax on domestic energy consumption, which should be nil given that
domestic consumption is exempt from the tax.
Second, I use a number of variables measured at the regional level and avail-
able from ISTAT, National Statistics Institutes, including GDP and employ-
ment by sector of economic activity for the period 2000 − 2009. Moreover, I
exploit information from EUROSTAT Statistics on human resources in science
and technology (S&T) occupations. Moving to the regional level substantially
reduces the number of observations (from over a thousand to less than 200),
but allows me to examine a richer set of indicators of real economic activity.
In particular, given the lack of territorial capital stock data, the size of human
resources in S&T occupations - available by level of skill - can be interpreted (as
discussed below) as a proxy for energy-saving capital. Finally, I use provinces’
and regions’ resident population size and age structure as controls. Summary
15Holmes (1998) uses US county manufacturing employment data to test the eﬀect of state
policies on the location of business. Devereux, Griﬃth and Simpson (2007) use plant-level data
to study firms’ location choices at the level of the UK counties. As argued by Guiso, Sapienza
and Zingales (2004) in their analysis of the economic impact of local financial development
within an integrated financial market in Italy: “From an economic point of view the natural
unit of analysis is the province.”
16Three regions (two small bilingual regions in the Alps, and the island of Sardinia) and
the corresponding seven provinces are excluded from the analysis beacuse of their peculiar
institutional status and of substantial changes in their structure of local government during
the decade considered here. Further, three provinces involved by boundary changes due to the
creation of new local authorities are excluded too. This leaves us with data on 93 provinces.
statistics are reported in table 2.
4.2 Estimation results
Tables 3 and 4 report the energy use estimation results on the panel of provinces.
All variables are in logs, and reported standard errors are clustered by region. I
control for nationwide influences on economic activity (such as state corporate
tax policy, pre-tax energy price movements, and the business cycle) by including
year dummies, and for unobserved time-invariant provincial traits by demean-
ing. Table 3 only includes the provincial and regional tax rates as explanatory
variables, while the specifications in table 4 control for resident population size
and share of elderly population, as well as for GDP measured at the regional
level.17
The results reveal virtually no impact of the two tax rates on total or domes-
tic electricity consumption: the latter turns out to be largely driven by the size
of resident population (column (4.2)), with an elasticity of 0.6. On the other
hand, the regional business income tax rate has a positive and significant eﬀect
(an elasticity of about 0.2) on total business electricity consumption and on the
part of it that is used in the service sector. The former eﬀect is less precisely
estimated, though, when GDP is controlled for in table 4: total business elec-
tricity consumption increases with GDP with an elasticity of 0.7, and decreases
with the share of elderly population with an elasticity of −0.7. Expectedly, the
energy tax turns out to have a significant negative eﬀect in the service sector
only, where most small and medium-sized firms that are liable to the payment
of the tax are found. The result is robust to the inclusion of population size and
composition and GDP as controls. The elasticity of electricity consumption in
the service sector to the electricity tax is estimated to be around −0.1.
As a robustness check of the above findings, tables 5 and 6 report the estima-
tion results of specifications where the growth rates of energy use in the various
sectors are employed as dependent variables, and are regressed on growth rates
of the explanatory variables. Table 6 in particular adds one year lags of the
energy use determinants. The overall picture is similar to the one emerging
from tables 3 and 4, though the energy tax eﬀect vanishes. However, the im-
pact of the regional business income tax in the service sector remains positive
and significant, and GDP and demographic change turn out to be important
determinants of total and business electricity consumption growth.
As a further check, table 7 shows the results of estimating a dynamic spec-
ification, where a lagged dependent variable is included along with lags of the
explanatory variables. I estimate the dynamic panel data model by the con-
ventional Arellano and Bond (1991) generalized method of moments (GMM)
that transforms the model in first diﬀerences to get rid of the province-specific
eﬀects, and uses lags of the dependent variable dated t− 2 as earlier as instru-
ments for the lagged dependent variable (Arellano and Bond, 1991). I use up
17The number of observations falls from 1020 in table 3 to 930 in table 4 because GDP is
observed until year 2009 only.
to the fifth lag to build the matrix of instruments. The first and second order
serial autocorrelation tests on the first-diﬀerenced equation residuals point to
the presence of first-order, but not of second-order serial correlation, suggest-
ing that twice lagged values of the dependent variable are valid instruments in
the first-diﬀerenced equation, while in two of the four equations the Sargan test
marginally rejects the hypothesis of instrument orthogonality. Again, the results
are generally compatible with the evidence presented above, with GDP playing
an important role in explaining energy consumption patterns. The elasticity of
energy use with respect to GDP is estimated to be around 0.3, a result that is
remarkably robust across the diﬀerent specifications.18 As for fiscal policies, the
eﬀect of the provincial electricity tax dwindles, while that of the regional busi-
ness income tax remains fairly strong in the service sector energy use equation.
The above specifications might suﬀer from an endogeneity problem and
thwart our attempt to identify the causal eﬀect of tax policy on variable factor
input use if provincial authorities anticipate changes in electricity consumption
and manoeuvre their tax rates accordingly. For instance, if local authorities
expect energy consumption to decline due, say, to widespread investment in
energy-saving technologies or rising energy prices, they might somewhat me-
chanically be forced to increase the electricity excise tax in order not to see
their tax revenues decline. Table 8 presents GMM estimates of a dynamic panel
data specification that allows provincial electricity tax rates to be determined
endogenously, adding electricity tax rates lagged t−2 to t−5 to the instrument
matrix. The first and second order serial autocorrelation tests as well as the
Sargan test now pass in all equations at conventional confidence levels. How-
ever, while the eﬀect of the electricity tax on electricity consumption turns out
now to be negative and large in the service sector (but not in the other sectors),
it is still imprecisely estimated.19
Table 9 reports the region-level specifications. Neither tax is estimated to
have a significant impact on GDP (column (9.1)), a result in line with Romer
and Romer (2010) finding of little macroeconomic impact of deficit-driven tax
increases. Leaving aside the issue of endogenous inter-regional migration, re-
gional GDP is estimated to grow with population with an elasticity of about
0.3. In column (9.2), employment in the service sector does indeed rise with
GDP and declines when the cost of labor increases due to the mandated tax
hike, while the eﬀect of the average provincial energy tax is not significant.
Columns (9.3) and (9.4) turn to the type of occupation of human resources.
In particular, column (9.3) uses the (log of the) stock of human resources in
S&T occupation as dependent variable, independently of workers’ education
level. Column (9.4) focuses instead on highly skilled human resources (those
that have successfully completed education at the third level in an S&T field of
study) that are employed in an S&T occupation. This mainly includes profes-
sionals and technicians with tertiary education, such as, for instance, IT system
18Notwithstanding the long disputed energy-growth conundrum (Ozturk, 2010), this result
is in line with the cross-country empirical evidence (Belke, Dobnik and Dreger, 2011).
19When also allowing for endogeneity of the regional business income tax rate and using
lags as instruments, the results are virtually identical as the ones in table 8.
designers, computer programmers, biologists, engineers and economists. In a
way, espousing the view of energy-saving capital as a manifestation of human
capital in the form of technical skills needed to optimally design and manage a
production process, human resources in S&T occupation might be interpretable
as a proxy for the stock of energy-saving capital in the regional economy. The
results show that the regional tax strongly and significantly aﬀects both vari-
ables, with the elasticity being slightly larger (over 0.3 in absolute value) for
highly skilled workers. On the other hand, average energy taxes in the region
turn out to have no eﬀect on human resources in S&T, plausibly due to the fact
that I cannot distinguish here between human resources that are employed by
large, energy-intensive firms that are exempt from the provincial electricity tax
and those in small and medium enterprises.
4.3 Spatial spillovers
Spatial diﬀerences in factor input prices could in principle foster mobility of busi-
ness activity across localities, and make economic outcomes and tax bases in a
jurisdiction depend on tax policies implemented in other jurisdictions (Brueck-
ner, 2003). Ignoring cross-locality fiscal spillovers when they are actually im-
portant might yield biased estimates of the impact of local taxes on economic
activity if decentralized tax policy follows a spatial auto-correlation pattern. If
economic activity in locality l (Xlt) is aﬀected by tax policy in locality j (zjt)
due, say, to tax base mobility, and cov(zlt, zjt) 6= 0, omission of zjt from the
empirical model will cause the estimate of the impact of zlt on Xlt to suﬀer
from a standard omitted variable bias.
In fact, as shown in table 13, the Moran test for spatial dependence reveals
some evidence of positive spatial auto-correlation among adjacent provinces’
policies in the mid-sample years, while the null hypothesis of random assignment
of energy tax rates in space cannot be rejected either in the early sample years,
or towards the end of the decade, when most provincial authorities were against
the statewide upper tax rate bound.20 In order to test for the relevance of
fiscal spillovers, I allow tax policies in neighboring localities to have an eﬀect on
economic performance in a locality. In particular, for each province and year,
I take a spatially weighted average of electricity tax rates in the other L − 1
provinces: eμlrt = LP
j=1
ωljμjst (14)
where {ωlj} ≥ 0 - with ωlj = 0 if l = j - is a set of non-stochastic weights
based on provinces’ geographic location, and might well equal (or be close to)
zero for a non-negligible number of (l, j) pairs (Anselin, 1988). Similarly, for
each region r = 1, ..., R and each year, I build a spatially weighted average of
20The Moran statistic equals ( ?X0 ?X)−1 ?X0W ?X, with ?X as the demeaned vector of the vari-
able of interest, and W a square matrix weighting observation pairs (typically in a binary
way) based on their vicinity (Anselin, 1988). In fact, the Moran statistic is the OLS estimate
from a regression of a first-order spatial lag of X on X.
business income tax rates in the other R− 1 regions:
eτ rt = RP
s=1
ωrsτst (15)
where the ωrs weights play a similar role as ωlj . In fact, ωlj = ωrs would
imply that all provinces located in a region are exposed to spill-overs of the
same intensity from tax policies in nearby regions, irrespective of their own
within-region location.
Based on (14) and (15), I experimented with a number of spatial patterns
that diﬀer by range and complexity. I report three sets of results in tables 10 to
12 based on fairly standard spatial modelling choices (McMillen, 2010). Table 10
reports the results of a region-level specification that relies on a border-sharing
criterion, meaning that ωrs = 1nr if regions r and s share a border, with nr
standing for the number of adjacent regions to region r, and ωrs = 0 otherwise.
The resulting spatial term in equation (15) is the average business income tax
rate in the regions bordering region r.21 Tables 11 and 12 report the estimation
results of province-level spatial specifications for the use of energy. In table
11, I use a border-sharing criterion, where energy use in a province is allowed
to be aﬀected by the average energy tax in adjacent provinces, irrespective of
whether those provinces belong to the same or diﬀerent regions. In table 12, I
use instead the average value added taxes and average provincial energy taxes
in the set of regions bordering the region where a province is located.
The results show no evidence of significant fiscal spillovers in either of those
spatial models, suggesting that tax policy changes did not bring about any ma-
jor shift of production facilities or variable factor input use to low-tax localities,
with factor input adjustment mostly taking place within localities. In fact, due
to plant relocation costs, shifting real production across localities in response to
tax diﬀerentials only tends to be a feasible option for multiplant firms operating
establishments in diﬀerent sites (Markusen, 1995), with local business respond-
ing to fiscal shocks in the short run chiefly by manoeuvring their flexible factor
input mix.
5 Concluding remarks
While the influence of tax policy on investment, employment and output growth
has long been studied in theoretical and empirical research, the global recession
and financial crisis of 2008—2009 put the search for eﬀective fiscal stimulus poli-
cies centre stage in academic as well as political discourses. On the other hand,
the disclosure of widespread local public finance distress in multi-tiered gov-
ernment structures seems to call for top-down fiscal consolidation policies that
could actually harm economic recovery and endanger the founding principles of
fiscal federalism in terms of fiscal autonomy and accountability.
21Each region has one to four neighbors. The island of Sicily is assumed to have as sole
neighbor the region of Calabria, at the extreme south-west of the peninsula.
Much of the academic and political controversy about the design of tax policy
and its expansionary versus contractionary eﬀects seems to arise from the fact
that “economists have surely not settled on a definitive theoretical model to
assess macroeconomic eﬀects of government purchases and taxes” (Barro and
Redlick, 2011: p. 67), or, even more importantly, from the dismal admission
that applied research on the response of real economic aggregates to changes
in government policies is “largely silent concerning whether the output eﬀects
operate through incentives and supply behavior or through disposable income
and demand stimulus” (Romer and Romer, 2010: p. 799). As a result, most
recent empirical works in this area take a fairly pragmatic stance and focus on
the policy endogeneity issue, oﬀering ingenious econometric approaches based
either on the exploitation of spatial discontinuities at administrative borders,
or on deep, narrative accounts of observed discretionary tax changes to tell
exogenous from endogenously determined ones.
This paper has put forward a novel, institution-based approach to dealing
with policy endogeneity in hierarchical government structures. It relies on state-
mandated local tax increases in order to identify the causal eﬀect of factor
input taxes on their use. Exploiting the exogenous nature of externally enforced
tax increases to deal with inherited budget deficits can complement existing
empirical methods, and is potentially applicable to federal structures as the
EU.
In particular, I have made use of the tax rate increases that were mandated
by the state in the Italian regions with excessive budget deficits around the
mid 2000s. The release of sensational data on the debt accumulated over the
latest terms of oﬃce in a number of regions led the state government in 2006
to mandate increases in regional own business income tax rates in order to
have the burden of debt recovery fall onto those regions’ taxpayers. I have
investigated the impact of regional business income taxes and provincial energy
taxes on a number of indicators of local economic activity. The panel data
estimation results reveal that mandated regional tax hikes had a significant
detrimental impact on employment in the service sector and particularly on
the use of human resources in S&T occupations, the latter being interpretable
as a proxy for energy-saving capital, and a positive impact on province-level
business energy use, lending support to the hypothesis of short run substitution
between energy and energy-saving capital. On the other hand, while there is
no evidence of major shift of production facilities or variable factor input use
to low-tax localities, provincial excise taxes on energy are found to discourage
business consumption of energy.
Finally, this paper has not tackled some important related issues. The first
concerns how political support for fiscal mandates arises and evolves in federa-
tions, along the lines of the political economy analyses of tax and expenditure
limitations in Nechyba (1997), Cremer and Palfrey (2000), Vigdor (2004) and
Calabrese and Epple (2010). Given the pervasiveness of limits, mandates and
other forms of central command on local authorities’ policies, the genesis and
transformation of those institutional arrangements in times of sovereign debt
crisis and fiscal consolidation seem to represent important topics for further
research. Second, I have not discussed the relative merits of alternative, non-
hierarchical central-local institutional arrangements, particularly the design of
US state-like mechanisms that give locally generated debt obligations priority
over other expenditures (Cooley and Marimon, 2011). Since unsustainable local
fiscal policies turn into local rather than national political problems under such
arrangements, it would then be local constituencies’ responsibility to mandate
fiscal discipline on their own administrators.
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Appendix
Proof of proposition 1
Totally diﬀerentiate the first order conditions (4), divide by dτ rt, and rearrange:£
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Solving system (16) by Cramer’s rule:
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¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯ £(θ − 1)θαlkθ−2lrt η¤
∙
γ
v + μlrt
h2lrt
¸
∙
γ
v + μlrt
h2lrt
¸
−
∙
2 (v + μlrt)
γklrt
h3lrt
¸
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
(17)
= ζrt
−2 (v + μlrt)
γklrt
h3lrt
− γ v + μlrt
h2lrt
D
< 0
dhlrt
dτrt
=
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
£
(θ − 1)θαlkθ−2lrt η
¤
ζrt∙
γ
v + μlrt
h2lrt
¸
ζrt
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯ £(θ − 1)θαlkθ−2lrt η¤
∙
γ
v + μlrt
h2lrt
¸
∙
γ
v + μlrt
h2lrt
¸
−
∙
2 (v + μlrt)
γklrt
h3lrt
¸
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
(18)
= ζrt
(θ − 1)θαlkθ−2lrt η − γ
v + μlrt
h2lrt
D
< 0
The determinant D in the denominator is positive due to concavity of the
profit function (3). This proves parts (i) and (ii) of the proposition. Using (1),
(17), and (18), and the fact that θαlkθ−1lrt η−(v + μlrt) γh
−1
lrt = (v + μlrt) γklrth
−2
lrt
from the first order conditions (4), the eﬀect on the use of energy is:
dεlrt
dτ rt
=
γ
hlrt
µ
dklrt
dτrt
¶
− γ klrt
h2lrt
µ
dhlrt
dτrt
¶
(19)
= ζrt
γ2
hlrtD
¡
−θ2αlkθ−1lrt η
¢
< 0
Proof of proposition 2
Totally diﬀerentiate the first order conditions (4), divide by dμlrt, and rearrange:£
(θ − 1)θαlkθ−2lrt η
¤ dklrt
dμlrt
+
∙
γ
v + μlrt
h2lrt
¸
dhlrt
dμlrt
=
γ
hlrt
∙
γ
v + μlrt
h2lrt
¸
dklrt
dμlrt
−
∙
2 (v + μlrt)
γklrt
h3lrt
¸
dhlrt
dμlrt
= −γklrt
h2lrt
(20)
Solving system (20) by Cramer’s rule:
dklrt
dμlrt
=
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯ γhlrt
∙
γ
v + μlrt
h2lrt
¸
−γklrt
h2lrt
−
∙
2 (v + μlrt)
γklrt
h3lrt
¸
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯ £(θ − 1)θαlkθ−2lrt η¤
∙
γ
v + μlrt
h2lrt
¸
∙
γ
v + μlrt
h2lrt
¸
−
∙
2 (v + μlrt)
γklrt
h3lrt
¸
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
(21)
= −
γklrt
h2lrt
µ
γ
v + μlrt
h2lrt
¶
D
< 0
dhlrt
dμlrt
=
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯
£
(θ − 1)θαlkθ−2lrt η
¤ γ
hlrt∙
γ
v + μlrt
h2lrt
¸
−γklrt
h2lrt
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯ £(θ − 1)θαlkθ−2lrt η¤
∙
γ
v + μlrt
h2lrt
¸
∙
γ
v + μlrt
h2lrt
¸
−
∙
2 (v + μlrt)
γklrt
h3lrt
¸
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
(22)
= −
γ
h2lrt
∙
(θ − 1)θαlkθ−1lrt η + γ
v + μlrt
hlrt
¸
D
= − 1
D
γ2 (v + μlrt)
h3lrt
∙
(θ − 1)klrt
hlrt
+ θ
¸
R 0 ⇐⇒ klrt
hlrt
R θ
1− θ
where I have used θαlkθ−1lrt η = (v + μlrt) γh
−1
lrt(1 + klrth
−1
lrt ) from (4). Finally,
the eﬀect of the excise tax on the use of energy is:
dεlrt
dμlrt
=
γ
hlrt
µ
dklrt
dμlrt
¶
− γ klrt
h2lrt
µ
dhlrt
dμlrt
¶
(23)
=
γ2
h3lrtD
(θ − 1)θαlkθlrtη < 0
Proof of proposition 3
Derive equation (12) with respect to μlrt:
dE [Elrt| zlrt]
dμlrt
(24)
=
ml
∆c
½
−γ klrt
h2lrt
Pr(clrt < c∗lrt) + γ
klrt
hlrt
∙
vlrt
γklrt
h2lrt
− urt
¸¾
dhlrt
dμlrt
+
ml
∆c
γ
klrt
hlrt
µ
dPr(clrt < c∗lrt)
dμlrt
¶
Using (6), and totally diﬀerentiating it to obtain dhlrtdμlrt :
dE [Elrt| zlrt]
dμlrt
= −ml
∆c
γklrt
h2lrt
½
hlrt
2vlrt
Pr(clrt < c∗lrt) + klrt
¾
< 0 (25)
Next derive equation (12) with respect to τ rt. Using (6), and with ιt =
ι(1− πt) + (δ − δ0):
dE [Elrt| zlrt]
dτrt
(26)
=
ml
∆c
½
−γ klrt
h2lrt
Pr(clrt < c∗lrt)
¾
dhlrt
dτrt
+
ml
∆c
γ
klrt
hlrt
µ
dPr(clrt < c∗lrt)
dτrt
¶
=
ml
∆c
½
−γ klrt
h2lrt
Pr(clrt < c∗lrt)
¾Ã
− h
3
lrt
2vlrtklrt
ιt
(1− πt − τ rt)2
!
−ml
∆c
γ
klrt
hlrt
"
ηλrt
1− πt − τ rt
+ hlrt
ιt
(1− πt − τrt)2
#
=
ml
∆c
ιt hlrt2vlrt Pr(clrt < c
∗
lrt)−
γklrt
hlrt
(ηλrt (1− πt − τrt) + ιthlrt)
(1− πt − τ rt)2
R 0 ⇐⇒ vlrt Q v∗lrt ≡
αlkθlrtη − ηλrt − hlrturt − c
γklrt
hlrt
³
2ηλrt(1−πt−τrt)+ιthlrtιthlrt + 1
´
Table 1 Mandated regional business income tax rates (%)
region 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Abruzzo 4.25 4.25 5.25 4.82 4.82 4.82
Calabria 4.25 4.25 4.25 3.90 4.82 4.97
Campania 4.25 4.55 5.25 4.82 4.97 4.97
Lazio 4.25 4.25 5.25 4.82 4.82 4.97
Liguria 4.25 4.25 5.25 3.90 3.90 3.90
Molise 4.25 4.25 5.25 4.82 4.82 4.97
Puglia 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.82 4.82 4.82
Sicilia 4.25 4.25 5.25 4.82 4.82 4.82
baseline rate 4.25 4.25 4.25 3.90 3.90 3.90
Table 2 Descriptive statistics
provinces
mean s.d. min max source
electricity use (MWh) TERNA Rete Elettrica
- total 2,904.8 3,035.3 323.8 21,976.8
- domestic 646.4 774.8 75.9 5,687.4
- business 2,258.4 2,377.8 171.5 16,959.5
- services 583.7 928.7 38.2 7848.5
electricity rate (€/MWh) 10.5 0.9 9.3 11.4 Italian Government
population (,000) 583.1 645.2 88.7 4194.0 ISTAT
elderly population (%) 20.7 2.9 12.3 27.9 ISTAT
regions
GDP (€ billion) 69.3 61.2 0.5 268.6 ISTAT
population (,000) 3,282.1 2,350.3 320.0 9,826.1 ISTAT
elderly population (%) 20.7 2.6 15.8 26.7 ISTAT
tertiary employment (,000) 810.4 618.5 63.6 2728.8 EUROSTAT
human resources in S&T 370.3 311.1 27.1 1491.0 EUROSTAT
skilled human res. in S&T 143.2 115.8 10.0 566.1 EUROSTAT
business income tax rate 4.33 0.3 3.9 5.25 Italian Government
Table 3 Province-level electricity use
Electricity use
total domestic business services
(3.1) (3.2) (3.3) (3.4)
τrt
0.116
(0.071)
-0.007
(0.043)
0.182∗∗
(0.085)
0.178∗∗
(0.069)
μlrt
0.015
(0.055)
0.010
(0.024)
0.008
(0.067)
-0.113∗∗
(0.051)
obs. 1020 1020 1020 1020
Notes: all variables in logs; year eﬀects and locality fixed eﬀects included; standard errors
clustered by region in brackets below the coeﬃcients; ∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗: p-value < 0.01, 0.05, 0.10.
Table 4 Province-level electricity use (constant output)
Electricity use
total domestic business services
(4.1) (4.2) (4.3) (4.4)
τ rt
0.153∗
(0.084)
0.042
(0.041)
0.200∗
(0.106)
0.185∗∗∗
(0.066)
μlrt
0.021
(0.053)
0.031
(0.019)
0.007
(0.069)
-0.106∗∗
(0.045)
population
0.475
(0.425)
0.601∗∗∗
(0.185)
0.348
(0.540)
-0.219
(0.359)
elderly share
-0.518∗∗
(0.322)
0.171∗∗
(0.071)
-0.657∗∗
(0.247)
-0.159
(0.250)
GDP
0.511
(0.325)
0.045
(0.130)
0.689∗
(0.403)
-0.322
(0.218)
obs. 930 930 930 930
Notes: see table 3.
Table 5 Province-level electricity use growth
Electricity use
total domestic business services
(5.1) (5.2) (5.3) (5.4)
τrt
0.209
(0.031)
-0.024
(0.024)
0.031
(0.037)
0.059∗∗
(0.024)
μlrt
0.006
(0.024)
0.034∗
(0.019)
-0.006
(0.034)
-0.001
(0.019)
population
0.181
(0.314)
0.256
(0.289)
0.082
(0.445)
-0.102
(0.229)
elderly share
-0.517∗∗∗
(0.140)
0.211
(0.135)
-0.666∗∗∗
(0.202)
-0.108
(0.196)
GDP
0.306∗∗∗
(0.111)
-0.071
(0.058)
0.377∗∗∗
(0.144)
-0.193
(0.137)
obs. 837 837 837 837
Notes: all variables in log(diﬀerence); one cross-section is lost in building growth rates;
year eﬀects included; standard errors clustered by region in brackets below the coeﬃcients;
∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗: p-value < 0.01, 0.05, 0.10.
Table 6 Province-level electricity use growth (lagged controls)
Electricity use
total domestic business services
(6.1) (6.2) (6.3) (6.4)
τ rt
0.032
(0.031)
-0.021
(0.026)
0.047
(0.037)
0.073∗∗∗
(0.025)
τ rt−1
-0.008
(0.037)
-0.007
(0.025)
-0.005
(0.049)
0.040
(0.041)
μlrt
-0.006
(0.031)
0.042∗
(0.023)
-0.028
(0.043)
0.014
(0.029)
μlrt−1
-0.015
(0.029)
-0.013
(0.023)
-0.017
(0.039)
-0.008
(0.027)
population
0.115
(0.295)
0.065
(0.407)
0.081
(0.400)
-0.108
(0.319)
populationt−1
0.137
(0.304)
0.213
(0.244)
0.096
(0.350)
0.012
(0.192)
elderly share
-0.412
(0.292)
0.481∗
(0.276)
-0.719∗∗
(0.371)
0.035
(0.327)
elderly sharet−1
-0.184
(0.332)
-0.268
(0.261)
-0.019
(0.413)
-0.217
(0.375)
GDP
0.330∗∗
(0.136)
-0.024
(0.079)
0.363∗∗
(0.166)
-0.210
(0.145)
GDPt−1
0.235∗
(0.136)
0.145
(0.076)
0.315∗
(0.167)
0.190
(0.210)
obs. 744 744 744 744
Notes: see table 5.
Table 7 Dynamic province-level electricity use
Electricity use
total domestic business services
(7.1) (7.2) (7.3) (7.4)
Elrt−1 0.750
∗∗∗
(0.179)
0.026
(0.061)
0.836∗∗∗
(0.127)
0.458∗∗∗
(0.115)
τrt
0.018
(0.033)
-0.034
(0.030)
0.016
(0.044)
0.073∗∗∗
(0.028)
τrt−1
-0.005
(0.042)
-0.017
(0.019)
-0.025
(0.048)
-0.007
(0.037)
μlrt
0.001
(0.032)
0.040
(0.021)
-0.020
(0.044)
0.017
(0.030)
μlrt−1
-0.016
(0.028)
-0.014
(0.021)
-0.014
(0.038)
-0.022
(0.036)
population
0.008
(0.303)
-0.001
(0.299)
0.251
(0.451)
-0.080
(0.364)
populationt−1
0.129
(0.341)
0.281
(0.202)
-0.104
(0.460)
-0.164
(0.340)
elderly share
0.050
(0.309)
0.477∗
(0.259)
-0.262
(0.412)
-0.248
(0.410)
elderly sharet−1
-0.249
(0.375)
-0.329
(0.232)
-0.001
(0.482)
-0.144
(0.361)
GDP
0.313∗∗∗
(0.130)
-0.048
(0.083)
0.321∗
(0.175)
-0.211
(0.146)
GDPt−1
0.118
(0.148)
0.230∗
(0.123)
0.060
(0.203)
0.308
(0.205)
AR(1) test (p value) -3.27 (0.00) -1.60 (0.10) -4.27 (0.00) -4.21 (0.00)
AR(2) test (p value) -0.38 (0.70) 0.10 (0.92) -0.11 (0.92) -0.80 (0.43)
Sargan test (p value) 37.12 (0.14) 50.44 (0.01) 30.57 (0.39) 46.39 (0.02)
obs. 744 744 744 744
Notes: Arellano and Bond (1991) generalized method of moments estimator; first step
results; robust standard errors in brackets; instruments used until lag t-5; AR(1) and AR(2)
are tests for first and second order serial correlation respectively, and are distributed as stan-
dard normal; the Sargan test is distributed as χ2 with 29 degrees of freedom (number of
overidentifying restrictions); ∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗: p-value < 0.01, 0.05, 0.10.
Table 8 Dynamic province-level electricity use (endogenous electricity tax)
Electricity use
total domestic business services
(8.1) (8.2) (8.3) (8.4)
Elrt−1 0.717
∗∗∗
(0.143)
0.028
(0.067)
0.811∗∗∗
(0.104)
0.356∗∗∗
(0.109)
τrt
0.018
(0.030)
-0.035
(0.031)
0.021
(0.039)
0.078∗∗∗
(0.032)
τrt−1
-0.006
(0.042)
-0.016
(0.020)
-0.013
(0.049)
0.009
(0.037)
μlrt
0.016
(0.084)
-0.034
(0.070)
0.030
(0.115)
-0.250
(0.156)
μlrt−1
0.038
(0.086)
0.016
(0.054)
0.057
(0.105)
0.111
(0.144)
population
-0.026
(0.268)
-0.014
(0.294)
0.190
(0.434)
-0.371
(0.378)
populationt−1
0.208
(0.303)
0.271
(0.206)
0.024
(0.429)
-0.011
(0.361)
elderly share
0.013
(0.308)
0.471∗
(0.259)
-0.289
(0.412)
-0.285
(0.425)
elderly sharet−1
-0.232
(0.378)
-0.324
(0.239)
0.015
(0.481)
-0.090
(0.355)
GDP
0.342∗∗∗
(0.132)
-0.061
(0.091)
0.351∗∗
(0.179)
-0.228
(0.159)
GDPt−1
0.143
(0.139)
0.212∗
(0.126)
0.111
(0.189)
0.321
(0.221)
AR(1) test (p value) -3.65 (0.00) -1.68 (0.09) -4.58 (0.00) -3.35 (0.00)
AR(2) test (p value) -0.41 (0.68) 0.21 (0.83) -0.18 (0.86) -1.38 (0.17)
Sargan test (p value) 64.77 (0.11) 69.26 (0.06) 57.34 (0.28) 54.14 (0.39)
obs. 744 744 744 744
Notes: Arellano and Bond (1991) generalized method of moments estimator; first step
results; robust standard errors in brackets; instruments used until lag t-5; AR(1) and AR(2)
are tests for first and second order serial correlation respectively, and are distributed as stan-
dard normal; the Sargan test is distributed as χ2 with 52 degrees of freedom (number of
overidentifying restrictions); ∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗: p-value < 0.01, 0.05, 0.10.
Table 9 Region-level economic indicators
GDP tertiary human resources in S&T
employment total highly skilled
(9.1) (9.2) (9.3) (9.4)
τrt
0.021
(0.020)
-0.104∗∗∗
(0.037)
-0.276∗∗∗
(0.077)
-0.316∗∗∗
(0.117)
μlrt
-0.020
(0.040)
0.002
(0.072)
0.163
(0.149)
0.011
(0.228)
population
0.317∗∗∗
(0.087)
0.103
(0.165)
0.673∗∗
(0.341)
-0.310
(0.521)
elderly share
-0.143
(0.095)
-0.158
(0.174)
-0.503
(0.359)
-1.216∗∗
(0.549)
GDP
0.349∗∗
(0.153)
0.212
(0.316)
-0.059
(0.483)
obs. 170 170 170 170
Notes: all variables in logs; year eﬀects and locality fixed eﬀects included; ∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗:
p-value < 0.01, 0.05, 0.10.
Table 10 Spatial spillovers: regions (border sharing)
GDP tertiary human resources in S&T
employment total highly skilled
(10.1) (10.2) (10.3) (10.4)
τrt
0.021
(0.022)
-0.126∗∗∗
(0.040)
-0.236∗∗∗
(0.083)
-0.335∗∗∗
(0.127)
μlrt
-0.020
(0.041)
0.022
(0.073)
0.126
(0.152)
0.028
(0.233)eτrt 0.001(0.035) 0.089(0.063) -0.166(0.130) 0.080(0.200)
population
0.318∗∗∗
(0.092)
0.176
(0.172)
0.538
(0.356)
-0.244
(0.548)
elderly share
-0.143
(0.097)
-0.118
(0.175)
-0.577
(0.363)
-1.180∗∗
(0.558)
GDP
0.348∗∗
(0.152)
0.213
(0.316)
-0.059
(0.484)
obs. 170 170 170 170
Notes: see table 8.
Table 11 Spatial spillovers: provinces (border-sharing)
Electricity use
total business services
(11.1) (11.2) (11.3)
τ rt
0.156∗
(0.084)
0.205∗
(0.105)
0.180∗∗∗
(0.065)
μlrt
0.118
(0.052)
0.003
(0.068)
-0.102∗∗
(0.048)eμlrt 0.066(0.106) 0.091(0.134) -0.085(0.112)
population
0.486
(0.439)
0.364
(0.558)
-0.234
(0.349)
elderly share
-0.521∗∗
(0.196)
-0.662∗∗
(0.248)
-0.155
(0.257)
GDP
0.498
(0.314)
0.670∗
(0.390)
-0.305
(0.222)
obs. 930 930 930
Notes: see table 3.
Table 12 Spatial spillovers: provinces (cross-region)
Electricity use
total business services
(12.1) (12.2) (12.3)
τ rt
0.135∗
(0.067)
0.193∗∗
(0.084)
0.138∗∗
(0.056)
μlrt
0.040
(0.044)
0.031
(0.057)
-0.089∗
(0.048)eτ rt 0.151(0.096) 0.155(0.125) 0.212(0.127)eμlrt 0.195(0.298) 0.291(0.404) 0.093(0.286)
population
0.541
(0.392)
0.425
(0.494)
-0.146
(0.362)
elderly share
-0.512∗∗
(0.185)
-0.658∗∗
(0.238)
-0.134
(0.253)
GDP
0.446
(0.323)
0.402
(0.390)
-0.394
(0.208)
obs. 930 930 930
Notes: see table 3.
Table 13 Moran test on provincial electricity tax rates
Moran test (p value)
2000 0.03 (0.54)
2001 0.06 (0.31)
2002 0.09 (0.14)
2003 0.12 (0.07)
2004 0.10 (0.15)
2005 0.17 (0.02)
2006 0.18 (0.01)
2007 0.13 (0.05)
2008 0.05 (0.38)
2009 0.05 (0.38)
Notes: 93 provincial electricity tax rates in each cross-section; the Moran statistic is
asymptotically normally distributed.
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